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Abstract
Peace scientists such as Kenneth Boulding, Ted Gurr, Thomas Schelling, and
Charles Tilly were fastidious in their use of abstract concepts free of the political
baggage that politicians, policymakers, and pundits necessarily foist upon the terms
in the rough and tumble world of politics. Too much contemporary peace science fails
to follow their lead. This essay describes this problem and proposes a useful heuristic
to help us improve.
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Concepts: Why the Words Peace Scientists Use Matter
One need embrace neither George Orwell (1946) nor Ju¨rgen Habermas (1981) to
appreciate that politicians, policymakers, and pundits use words to mobilize support. Of
particular interest to those of us engaged in the scientific study of conflict and peace,
demonizing “the enemy” and lionizing one’s own virtues are part and parcel to the
practice of politics that we study, though unlike other students of politics, our field of
inquiry includes the loss of life, limb and property, sometimes on a very large scale. I
submit to you that those of us in the peace science community have been failing, quite
glaringly in my view, of late to appreciate that the concepts we use in our theories are
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2 Conflict Management and Peace Science 32(3)
not immune from the political usage of words in daily politics. Put plainly: when we use
terms in our theories that are used by politicians, policymakers, and pundits, we cannot
escape the political baggage these words bring with them.1.
As far as I can tell, the current problem has not always been this dire. Indeed, peace
scientists such as Boulding (1962), Schelling (1966), Gurr (1970), Dahl (1971), Tilly
(1978), and Blalock (1989) consistently employed abstract concepts divorced from the
terms used by politicos2. to describe the same events, phenomena and processes. As I
trained to enter the field and read the works of these, and other, scholars I was struck by
their use of abstract concepts, which was notably different from those I had read in in the
press and journals such as Foreign Affairs during high school and college. I submit that
this practice has considerable scientific value; we would do well to push one another to
embrace it.
We know the rule for concepts: theory requires abstraction. When we theorize we
should seek to determine whether a given theory still holds when we increase the
generality of our concepts (e.g., Cohen and Nagel 1934, pp. 14-18, 21-22, 223-244).
More pithily, we are taught the dictum: don’t use proper nouns.
While that is sound advice for all practicing scientists, those of us who are social
scientists, and especially those of us who study conflict and peace, bear an additional
burden. Our work is normatively laden. Because words are a primary tool used by the
politicos who engage in political competition, and the journalists who cover them, we
have an additional reason to produce abstract concepts not (yet)3. used in public debates
about conflict and peace. Politicos are professional wordsmiths who literally use words to
mobilize support across politically salient cleavages. They dominate public conversation,
as they should,4. and we cannot, in the short run, hope to successfully compete in that
arena. Put directly: we should avoid the pejorative words that politicos and journalists
use.
Before moving into the argument I offer, for your consideration, quotes from some of
the works cited above. Boulding (1962, p. vii) explains that his book
does not deal, except by way of occassional illustration, with the current
historical situation in detail, for it has been inspired not only by a practical
end but by the belief that applied science cannot succeed unless it guides
its empirical study by reins, however loose, of abstract theory. Although a
theory of war and peace and of international relations is perhaps the most
important part of this work, it is by no means the whole of it, because of
another conviction which grew in my mind. . . in 1944 and 1955. This was
the conviction that, in order to develop a theoretical system adequate to deal
with the problem of war and peace, it is necessary to cast the net wider and to
study conflict as a general social process of which war was a special case.5.
One need not subscribe to Boulding’s conviction about theorizing at that highly general
level to appreciate the importance of abstraction and generalization that guided him in
his craft.
Both Gurr and Tilly address the ethical issue I highlight. Consider first Gurr (1970, pp.
xx-xxi).
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A general explanation of political violence can become a guide to action as
well as comprehension. . . Social theory can be put to unethical as well as
ethical ends, and an author has little control over the use of his work short of
refusing to publish. . . This book is as likely to be read by rebels as by rulers
and suggests as many effective courses of action for one as for the other.
He goes on to elucidate what dissidents, and then states, can draw from it.
Tilly (1978, p. 5) notes that the very people we study consider themselves experts on
the topic and do not appreciate being told that they are not. He continues:
It is more delicate than that. Deep in every discussion of collective action
stirs the lava of a volcanic eruption: collective action is about power
and politics; it inevitably raises questions of right and wrong, justice and
injustice, hope and hopelessness; the very setting of the problem is likely to
include judgments about the right to act, and what good it does.
Gurr and Tilly were explicitly self-aware of the ethical issue at the heart of this essay.
Those of us who choose to participate in peace science must shoulder that burden and
press the other members of our community to do the same. We all know this is so, and
by raising it I risk offending the reader. I am willing to take the risk because we do not
yet widely recognize that being self aware about these ethical issues has an important
implication. Though neither Gurr nor Tilly explicitly discuss the importance of using
abstract concepts that generate distance from contemporary political debate, their work,
like that of the other luminaries cited above, did so. We will do well to follow their
example.
Intersubjective Agreement: Discourse does not Occur in a
Vacuum
When we use the words employed by politicos as concepts in our theories, we engage
in a political act, regardless of whether we intend it as such or recognize that we do so.
Why? The foundation of natural language is intersubjective agreement about grammar
and the definitions of words. Both grammar and definitions change over time (i.e., in the
long run), but the fact that they are fixed in the short run makes communication possible.
Below I leverage this distinction between the fixed short run and fluid long run. For now
let us focus on the short run.
Many of you have likely encountered a student who insisted that a given definition of
a term is flawed and wanted to redefine the term in some way that struck you as unlikely
to gain wide circulation. You presumably counseled the student not to pursue that path.
Why? Because you (implicitly) recognized the difference between the short and long run
in discourse and were dubious about that student’s ability to lead a revolution.
This is all rather banal, and I share it as backstory to which I return below. Let me now
offer a personal digression that further sets the stage for what is to come.
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Diary: Selecting “Dissident” & “State”
I had the good fortune to be a student in Gurr’s Political Violence seminar during the first
semester of my graduate studies. During the discussion of Why Men Rebel he shared with
us two regrets he had about the book. First, were he able to have a do-over, in the title
and throughout, he would substitute the word people for the word men. Second, although
he had discussed state coercion, he had failed to discuss state terror. I took from that
discussion that we tend to be trapped by the implicit cultural and political assumptions
of our time, and I developed my own conviction: scientists must strive to transcend that.
To that end I wrestled, over the following year or so, with the issue of what terms I
should adopt to identify the two central actors that I was certain would play a role in my
theorizing:
1. Groups of people who band together to challenge government (policies) and adopt
extra-systemic means to do so, and
2. The governments that seek to sustain the status quo in the face of such challenges.
During that time I began to consume the news about conflict and peace through new eyes.
I had long appreciated that politicos use words as tools to mobilize, but the readings
in Gurr’s seminar showed me that social scientists could use them to develop causal
theories. The literature provided me with new tools to think about what was reported in
the news. I decided I had a problem: I needed to identify terms to describe those two
groups that were not being used by politicos. The term state was fairly easy to identify
and select. Then Lichbach (1987) was published, and I found in it dissident. I tinkered
for another year or more before settling, but my problem was solved.
I have a fantasy in which this is a rite of passage that all peace scientists go through:
whatever their specific domain of inquiry, during the early years of their PhD study
budding peace scientists wrestle with the ethical issues discussed above and bandy about
concepts that permit them to successfully negotiate the shoals. Experience, of course,
lays ruin to fantasy.6.
Representative Problems: Terrorism/ist, Extremism/ist,
Islamism/ist, and (in)Stability
These are but four terms that politicos use and we should not: terrorism/ist, extremism/ist,
Islamism/ist and (in)stability. Below I discuss each term, but first I want to use the
search engine images.google.com to substantiate my claim about pejorative labels
in public discourse.7. Three days prior to my address at the 2014 Peace Science meeting
I entered these five terms into that engine, and took a screen capture. Figures 1 through
5 display the results. I suspect the reader will agree that this face validity exercise is
consistent with my point.
The terms terrorism and terrorist are the objects of a well known definitional debate
(e.g., Schmid 2004, 2012), and I will not try to summarize it here (see Easson and Schmid
2011). I will observe that the suffix -ist is commonly defined as denoting an adherent of
a system of beliefs, principles, etc., and is often expressed by nouns ending in -ism.
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Figure 1. Terrorist: Google Images, November 2014
This lays bare the rhetorical value of the term terrorist: by identifying their system of
beliefs as terror, politicos are half way home denying that the dissidents so labeled have
political objectives, policy proposals, etc. Rather than use the terms terrorism or terrorist
in my research, I speak of “a state terror campaign,” “dissidents using terror tactics”
and similar locutions. To embrace abstract theorizing I rely upon Schelling’s (1966)
and Stohl’s (1983) discussions to inform my conceptualization of terror as a coercion
tactic (Moore et al. 2011), but many other abstract conceptualizations are available. Yet
providing a precise, abstract definition is not enough. Dropping the -ism and -ist is not
difficult, and doing so facilitates scientific practice by putting distance between it and the
rhetorical fray of politicos.
Figure 2. Extremism: Google Images, November 2014
The terms extremism and extremist suffer from a lighter version of affixing the -ist
and -ism suffixies to terror: subscribing to an extreme belief system is less noxious than
Prepared using sagej.cls
Pr
ep
rin
t P
roo
f
6 Conflict Management and Peace Science 32(3)
subscribing to a terror belief system. Yet, as Figure 2 demonstrates, the term, as used in
public discourse, is pejorative.
When peace scientists use the term they tend to either leave it undefined, leaving the
reader to decide whether the pejorative use in public discourse or some other meaning
is intended. Any term can be defined so as to make it precise, and peace scientists
might adopt a unidimensional spatial model and define extremists as those who advocate
policies that are far from the status quo (e.g., perhaps more than two standard deviations).
They might alternatively define extremists as supporters of a group that has less than
10 percent of the density’s support. Other variations surely exist. Yet trying to define
precisely terms used by politicos runs afoul of the fact that the resultant definition is at
odds with the usage in political discourse and that usage is pejorative.
Consider, for example, another term that is used very differently in public and scientific
discourse: rational. As an economics major in college I quickly came to learn that when
my professors’ used the term rational they meant something distinct (and considerably
more precise) from what my family and friends meant when they used the term. Scientific
discourse is rife with such examples.8. Does this demonstrate that the problem I
have identified is not our use of these terms, but instead that members of the scientific
community must do a better job of pressing one another to define their terms? Indeed,
the considerable success of the public v. scientific usage of the same term demonstrates
that I am barking up the wrong tree. Right?
It does not. The differences are:
1. Pejorative labeling;
2. Emotional costs imposed by conflict.
When we introduce our undergraduate students to the specialized usage of terms like
rational or correlation in scientific discourse we are not expecting them to abandon
pejorative labels that are tied to strong emotional responses. Because of that, we require
only that they recognize the context in which they are so that they can decide which
usage is appropriate. Parsing meaning as a function of context is something at which
human beings excel, and thus many students are able to do so without much difficulty.9.
When we ask students, policymakers, or colleagues outside of our field, however, to do
such parsing with terms used to discuss conflict and peace we are placing much greater
demands on them. I do not think those demands are reasonable. Indeed, I believe we
delude ourselves should we argue that peace scientists can routinely parse such meanings.
I am certain, however, that many of our colleagues who study conflict and peace outside
of the scientific community will struggle to meet such expectations.10.
The terms Islamism and Islamist are quite reasonably given the -ism and -ist suffix:
on its face the words denote people who subscribe to a belief system informed by Islam.
As such, these terms initally appear to be unproblematic for peace scientists. The trouble
begins when we consider usage of these terms during this specific historical moment.
Absent the successful mobilization of groups like Al Qaeda that have as a goal the
establishment of a global caliphate based on an unorthodox interpretation of the Mulsim
faith coupled with that mobilization being a function, in part, of their use of terror
tactics, these terms would not be problematic. They would also not be associated with
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Figure 3. Islamist: Google Images, November 2014
the imagery in Figure 3, nor would it be readily apparent why anyone studying peace and
conflict would be likely to want to use those terms. Yet, Al Qaeda and smiliar groups have
successfully mobilized, and those of us who use the English language to communicate
cannot escape the pejorative usage of those terms by so many English speaking politicos.
Figure 4. Stability: Google Images, November 2014
The terms stability and instability represent another problem: status quo bias. Any
given status quo partitions economic, political, and social power. All states share a
common goal of defending the domestic status quo. Stability represents order and
predictability. Order and predictability have positive connotations. Instability connotes
the opposite of order and predictability, and is thus pejorative. If we give it a little thought,
it is not difficult to see that stability maintains the status quo while instability threatens it.
Yet, in public discourse the proportion of the public who will make that association will
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8 Conflict Management and Peace Science 32(3)
be small. This is why (in)stability is so useful to politicos in power, and why we must not
use it. Figures 4 and 5 are quite consistent with my argument.
Figure 5. Instability: Google Images, November 2014
A Counter-Factual Illustration
“A face validity check is nice,” I imagine the reader may be thinking, “but I need an
example from the literature.” Quite right. A single example is sufficient, but I invite the
reader to select an issue of Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, or
many others, search for one of the terms above (or one of your own choosing), and try
the exercise below on your own.11. I promise, you will not find the exercise terribly
difficult.
Let us examine what it might look like if we replace troublesome terms used
by journalists, pundits and politicos with concepts they do not use. Consider this
passage from Shapiro and Fair’s (2010) “Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy”
(emphases mine):
These policy prescriptions rest on–and indeed reflect–four powerful
conventional wisdoms. The first is that poverty is a root cause of support
for militancy, or at least that poorer and less-educated individuals are more
prone to militants’ appeals. The second is that personal religiosity and
support for sharia (Islamic law) are strongly correlated with support for
Islamist militancy. The third is that support for political goals espoused
by legal Islamist parties predicts support for militant organizations. The
fourth is that those who support democracy–either in terms of supporting
democratic processes such as voting or in terms of valuing core democratic
principles–oppose Islamism and militancy.
Let’s try it using abstract concepts of the type Boulding, Gurr, Schelling, Tilly and others
might use (denoted in italics).
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These policy prescriptions rest on–and indeed reflect–four powerful
conventional wisdoms. The first is that poverty is a root cause of support
for militancy, or at least that poorer and less-educated individuals are more
prone to militants’ appeals. The second is that personal religiosity and
support for religious law are strongly correlated with support for dissident
militancy among people of faith. The third is that support for political goals
espoused by legal dissident parties predicts support for militant dissident
organizations. The fourth is that those who support democracy–either in
terms of supporting democratic processes such as voting or in terms of
valuing core democratic principles–oppose religious political mobilization
and militancy.
What do you think? Which version is more useful to scientific discourse (i.e., the
construction of theories of politics, and the empirical testing of hypotheses derived from
those theories)?
Now let’s replace the word militant.
These policy prescriptions rest on–and indeed reflect–four powerful
conventional wisdoms. The first is that poverty is a root cause of support for
dissident groups that use violence, or at least that poorer and less-educated
individuals are more prone to the appeals of such groups. The second is that
personal religiosity and support for religious law are strongly correlated with
support among people of faith for dissident groups that use violence. The
third is that support for political goals espoused by legal dissident parties
predicts support for dissident organizations that use violence. The fourth is
that those who support democracy–either in terms of supporting democratic
processes such as voting or in terms of valuing core democratic principles–
oppose religious political mobilization and violent dissent.
Is that any better?
While the particular political cleavage that Shapiro and Fair explore in their study
is religious, they fail to explain why religion is a cleavage that is distinct from other
cleavages.12. This represents a generic problem in studies of ethnic conflict: we often
implicitly assume an essentialism, that conflicts where mobilization occurs over an
ethnic cleavage are importantly distinct from those where mobilization occurs over other
cleavages. In effect, concepts that cover the special case of mobilization over a religious
cleavage (such as Tilly’s (1978, pp. 62–4) catnet, for example) are dismissed because
they are presumably too general. That is, peace scientists who study “ethnic conflict,”
“terrorism,” “counter-insurgency,” “civil war,” and so forth are implicitly arguing that the
conflict processes that unfold in the type of dissident–state interaction they are studying is
meaningfully distinct from the conflict processes that unfold in other forms of dissident–
state interaction. While I do not share such a view, peace scientists who wish to advance
such an argument should be expected to make an explicit case about why the processes
they are studying in the specific type of dissident–state interaction differ meaningfully
from the general pattern of dissident–state interactions.
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My best guess about why many peace scientists eschew abstract, general theorizing
is nicely captured by Barbara Geddes (2003), who observes that research in political
science tends to be driven by contemporary political events, with something like a three
to five year lag. This interest in current events produces our strong tendency to ask
research questions using the terms that we find in the public discourse. This weakens
the scientific enterprise.13. When there is a plain, superior alternative available—adopt
abstract, general concepts to build theory—why sustain our present habit of grafting the
terms used by politicos onto our theories?
The practice of science is a collective enterprise. Those of us who self identify as
community members recreate the norms of science. In the short run those norms are
structure, but in the medium to long run that structure shifts in response to the debates
the community undertakes about best practices. The bar is presently too low: we are
giving one another a pass when it comes to the concepts we employ. By expecting more
of one another we can improve.
Here’s the takeaway: when we eschew the terms used by politicos and embrace more
abstract concepts, peace science is improved in two ways at no cost:14.
1. Our theories are more general;
2. We avoid political baggage
Both of these goals warrant our attention.
Got Heuristic?
How might we change? Here is a quick check we can all undertake to determine whether
a concept is appropriate: do journalists, pundits and politicos use it? If so, it is tainted.
Don’t use it in your research.
Au Contraire: The Case for Engaging the Fight
Some will concur with my claim that terms like terrorism/ist, extremism/ist, Islamism/ist,
and (in)stability are often used in biased, overly status-quo oriented, sloppy, and
otherwise problematic ways, yet claim that rather than foreswear their usage peace
scientists must not cede those terms to politicos and journalists, but instead use these
terms well, and thereby change public debate.15. To concede the terms is, in effect,
capitulation, a form of retreat behind the walls of the ivory tower, and thus directly at
odds with my claim about the importance of concepts.
This is an important counter–claim. To address it I need to distinguish between the
short and long runs. For the short run I disagree: as I argue above, public discussion
is necessarily dominated by political elites and they use terms for an entirely different
purpose than we do.
What of the long run? Here I seek an assist from John Maynard Keynes who closed
his 1936 book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, this way:
the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are
right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly
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understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who
believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences,
are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority,
who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic
scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests
is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.
Not, indeed, immediately, but after a certain interval; for in the field of
economic and political philosophy there are not many who are influenced
by new theories after they are twenty five or thirty years of age, so that the
ideas which civil servants and politicians and even agitators apply to current
events are not likely to be the newest. But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested
interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.
The concepts scientists use do not impact public discussion in real time, but instead,
a generation or two later. We teach the courses that tomorrow’s leaders take in
college, and the concepts, theories and findings we are debating today find their way
into undergraduate coursework roughly a decade later. Those students become leaders
roughly two decades later.16. At the conceptual level especially our contribution to
public discourse occurs over the long run. In other words, we must adopt what is, in
effect, a guerrilla tactic: conceding the ground during the short run, only to take it over
the long run.
Two issues require attention. First, one might ask what happens when we shift forward
a generation? Do I imagine a world in which politicos now speak like social scientists? I
do not. Krugman (1994) chronicles politicos co-opting academic terminology and theory,
in some cases with a considerable assist from faculty, demonstrating that today’s long-
run becomes tomorrow’s short-run. To be sure, future generations of peace scientists will
have to confront tomorrow’s politicos just as we do today’s. Such is the nature of dynamic
systems. Yet, this dynamism does not makee Keynes wrong.17.
That said, let us turn second to specific examples of the lagged generational impact of
ideas upon a topic from peace science: riots. Echoes of the largely discredited ideas of
Le Bon (1897), made into social scientific theory by Smelser (1962) among others, that
crowds have a dynamic that tends to lower individuals’ inhibitions to the lowest among
them can still be found today (Dalrymple 2011; Stein 2015). Yet, while bemoaning
the momentary collapse of “civilization” in 2011 London and 2015 Baltimore, both
authors take care not to paint all members of “the crowd” with Le Bon’s broad brush.
That is, these politicos temper their punditry in deference to the work of Gurr and
others that emphasizes the complex interactions among protestors, police, politicians
and the media that produce riots (for a review see Wilkinson 2009). More directly
to Keynes’s claim, plenty of the media coverage of the events in 2011 London (e.g.,
Editors 2015a) and 2015 Baltimore (e.g. Editors 2015b; Badger 2015; Mmari et al. 2015)
reflect the extent to which research by peace scientists writing in the 1970s and 1980s
influences contemporary understanding. I trust the reader is sufficiently familiar with
additional politicos’ statements about protests and riots that I need not elaborate and can
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observe that contemporary public conversation illustrates both the challenge and promise
contained in Keynes’s observation.
Parting Words
I cannot tell you how many times during my career a researcher who does not study
peace science has said to me something akin to: “Well, at least you don’t have to explain
the importance of studying your topic. I study X, and I am always having to explain
why anyone should care.” Yet the advantage conferred by this prima facie importance is
counter-balanced by a burden. Our topic is also part and parcel of political conflict, and
this means that—in the short run—the discourse of politicos, who necessarily grind axes,
will overwhelm our own debates with respect to the meaning of terms.
We are idea–smiths, and the concepts that we employ are central to our craft. Our
collective output has a far reaching impact, but it occurs in the long run. Politicos, on
the other hand, are exercising power in real time and the short run. Peace scientists
should and will engage public debate, conduct research funded by governments, and
consult with policymakers. When we wear that hat it would be counter productive to
employ the specialized langauge we use to communicate with one another and expect
those audiences to follow. Just as we require our students to learn to adopt different
definitions of words depending on context, we too must expect it of ourselves. We have
invested heavily in intellectual capital and are well overqualified to be able to move back
and forth across specialized v. politico discourse. Arguments that if we want our resarch
to be relevant to policy makers we must theorize using the terms used by politicos are
folly.
In closing I wish to observe an exciting development that will facilitate our ability
to engage and influence policy makers. The Monkey Cage of The Washington Post is
edited by political scientists, and publishes content exclusively produced by political
scientists and other social scientists who study politics. Two of the contributors at
The Upshot of The New York Times are political scientists, and the blog Political
Violence @ a Glance has a wide readership outside of academia.18. The data
journalism site fivethirtyeight.com got its start producing ensemble forecasts of US
Presidential elections. In short, there is considerable reason for optimism that peace
science will increasingly gain relevance in public affairs. Writing in 1936 Keynes could
not have imagined the value a Masters degree in economics would provide a prospective
government bureaucrat: the temporal lag between scholarly debate in economics and
policy impact is surely shorter today than it was in the 1930s. I fully anticipate that
the relevance of peace science (and political science more broadly) to policy makers
will grow over the coming decades much as it did for economics during the post World
War II era. And I expect that those who construct their theories using the terminology
employed by politicos are considerably less likely to see their work contribute to progress
in the field over the long run than those who eschew that terminology in favor of abstract
concepts.
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Notes
1. To be sure, some researchers who study conflict and peace are political hacks masquerading,
perhaps quite unaware, as scientists, or otherwise deploying tools of our trade to advance
political goals in the name of country, “civilization,” self aggrandisement, or what have you.
I am disinterested in these “scholars” and wish to address those of us who are engaged in the
practice of science.
2. By politicos I am referring to politicians (including their staff), policymakers (i.e., government
bureaucrats), and pundits.
3. Below I make clear the purpose of this paranthetical insert.
4. I am opposed to a scientific technocratic order.
5. He then explains that not only this book, but his founding of the Journal of Conflict Resolution
and a center at the University of Michigan were also the fruit of this convitction.
6. The community of peace scientists who study intrastate conflict and peace appear to lag behind
those who study interstate conflict and peace. State A and State B have long been staples in
that literature, and I am hard pressed to identify many examples of terms in that area of inquiry
that are similar to those I discuss below. This may, however, reflect an information asymmetry:
I am much better versed in the former than the latter.
7. The search engine returns images based on a page rank algorithm that measures the extent to
which the page in question has ties to other pages on the Wolrd Wide Web. The result, then, is
images ordered by the rank of their pages, and for this exercise provides a useful measure of
the imagery most commonly associated with a term.
8. When I teach undergraduate research methods I frequently warn the students that terms like
correlation have precise meanings that are different from how they have used these terms.
9. I have spent my career teaching at large public universities in the US, and my experience has
been that many, though not most, have both the ability and the interest in doing this well. I
fantasize that the vast majority of students at selective private universities in the US have both
the ability and interest in doing so, but have no experience upon which to draw.
10. Interestingly, our colleagues who work within critical and post-modern paradigm and study
conflict and peace will be able to do so well, though I suspect most would agree with the
general tenor of my argument and also reject terms used by politicos in what they might refer
to as the dominant discourse.
11. Inevitably, I hav to select a publication to “pick on,” and I have selected one of Jake Shapiro’s
articles. I selected Jake’s work for several reasons. One, Jake does excellent work. Two, despite
how much I value reading his work, I have on multiple occassions winced at his use of concepts
like those noted above. Finally, at a workshop sponsored by the START Center at University of
Maryland in January 2014, Jake began his presentation pointing out that he had once been told
that if you are going to pick a fight, select someone who is worth fighting with (or something
to that effect). I made a mental note: Jake is fair game, and I hope this essay influences his
work going forward. I could, of course, have selected the work of any of a score or more peace
scientists to illustrate.
12. Jake Shapiro was kind enough to explain that he and Christine Fair spent considerable time
debating whether to use Islamic militants and Islamism in their article. They decided that,
because there were many other dissident actors employing violent tactics in 2007 Pakistan that
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were neither advocating sharia law nor making religious appeal, these terms best reflected the
intersection of the constellation of specific actors and policy positions that they were trying to
describe.
13. Please note that I am not suggesting we abandon current events as stimulation for our research
questions. Rather, I am suggesting that we recognize the pitfall of grafting the terms used by
politicos in their debates about current events and shun them in favor of abstract concepts that
have greater scientific value.
14. Some might argue that peace scientists who embrace abstract concepts will find it more difficult
to get their research funded or have less impact upon policymakers. I suspect most readers
will agree with me that such an argument about funding is self evidently problematic. The
latter argument will hold for scholars who expect policymakers to engage their scholarship
directly. I have the impression that some (many?) in fact do, but to me this is silly. Has any
science become influential due to non-expert consumption of its peer review publications? Of
course not. Journals like Nature, Science and The New England Journal of Medicine have press
releases for a reason, and we are starting to see some of that in political science. More gnerally,
we must (find agents to) translate our technical work into publicly digestible form, and in the
conclusion I briefly touch on this issue.
15. I am indebted to Page Fortna for this point.
16. In Washington, DC, Congressional staffers can be influential within a decade of graduation, but
I have no idea whether this is common in other political systems, and am content to consider
it an exception that supports the rule (i.e., an outlier): as a cohort our students do not obtain
leadership positions in their careers and communities until their 40s.
17. Indeed, Krugman titled chapter eight of his book “In the Long Run Keynes is Still Alive.”
18. Full disclosure: I am an editor at Political Violence @ a Glance.
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